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"MAKE" MEANS "MAKE": REJECTING
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S Two-HEADED
INTERPRETATION OF JANUS CAPITAL
C. Steven Bradford*
A TRIBUTE TO ALAN BROMBERG
It's an honor to contribute to this symposium honoring the late Alan
Bromberg. Alan was a valuable mentor, a role model, and a friend. If not
for Alan, I might not be a law professor today, and I certainly would not
have had as good a career.
Alan was of counsel to the Dallas law firm I worked for when I gradu-
ated from law school, and I had the good fortune to work with him on a
couple of cases early in my career. I will never forget his patience, his gen-
tleness, and, above all, his encyclopedic knowledge of federal securities
law. It always amazed me that he could immediately point me to relevant
cases and articles, sometimes with citations, even when I knew he was out
of his office without access to any source materials.
When I decided to enter the law teaching market, I turned to Alan for
advice. He was instrumental in getting me a visiting position at SMU,
where he not only sat in on my class and talked to me about academic
issues, but also generously provided a copy of his lengthy business associa-
tions teaching notes, a godsend in my first year of teaching. When I applied
for a full-time teaching job, Alan served as one of my references and coun-
seled me in choosing among law schools.
Many times in the course of my career, Alan provided feedback, served
as a reference, offered advice on job opportunities, and generally acted as a
mentor. I am forever grateful for what that thoughtful, incredibly gentle
man has meant to my career. I will never be the legal scholar (or the per-
son) that Alan was, but his example gives me something to strive for.
Alan was the leading expert on Rule lOb-5, so it's only fitting that this
article deals with Rule lob-5.
I. INTRODUCTION
HO is liable for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5? The Su-
preme Court has addressed that question several times over
the past twenty-five years, beginning with its rejection of aiding
*Earl Dunlap Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Col-
lege of Law. My thanks to Stephen Knudsen for his excellent research assistance.
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and abetting liability in 1994,1 continuing with its limitation of so-called
scheme liability in 2008,2 and culminating with the 2011 decision on which
this article focuses, Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.3
Janus involved subsection (b) of Rule lOb-5, which makes it unlawful to
"make" a false or misleading statement in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.4 Janus held that one makes a statement for pur-
poses of Rule 10b-5(b) only if one has "ultimate authority over the state-
ment, including its content and whether and how to communicate it."'5
Others involved in the drafting or dissemination of a fraudulent state-
ment are not liable.
Not surprisingly, Janus has generated quite a bit of discussion in the
lower courts, much of it asking whether Janus applies outside of Rule
10b-5(b). Some cases have held that Janus does not apply to scheme lia-
bility under subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5.6 Other cases have held
that Janus does not apply to actions pursuant to section 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act.7 Even in cases involving Rule 10b-5(b), courts have wrestled
with what exactly it means to have ultimate authority over a false state-
ment. A couple of cases extend Janus's definition of maker beyond any
recognizable bounds, but even those cases still claim to be applying
Janus.8
None of those cases challenge the central holding of Janus-that, to be
liable under Rule 10b-5(b), a defendant must have the ultimate legal au-
thority over the fraudulent statement.9 Only one case, Prousalis v.
Moore,10 has refused to apply the Janus definition of "maker" in an ac-
tion under Rule 10b-5(b). In Prousalis, a panel of the Fourth Circuit held
that the word "make" in Rule 10b-5(b) must be read differently in crimi-
1. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
166-201 (1994).
2. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 148-80
(2008).
3. 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2297-2312 (2011).
4. Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
5. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
6. See, e.g., SEC v. Monterosso, 557 F. App'x 917, 925 (11th Cir. 2014); SEC v.
Garber, 959 F. Supp. 2d 374, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, 2011
WL 5871020, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); Haw. Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v.
Cole, 2011 WL 3862206, at *5-7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011), reconsideration denied, 2013
WL 3147974 (N.D. Ohio June 19, 2013). But see SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343-44
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that Janus also applies to scheme liability claims).
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA Inc., 783 F.3d 786, 795-98 (11th Cir.
2015); SEC v. Benger, 931 F. Supp. 2d 904, 905-07 (N.D. Ill. 2013); SEC v. Stoker, 865 F.
Supp. 2d 457, 464-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, 2011 WL
5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011). But see SEC v. Perry, 2012 WL 1959566, at *8
(C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012) (holding that only "makers" are liable under section 17(a)); SEC
v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same).
8. See SEC v. Garber, 959 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that the
non-attorney defendants were makers of attorneys' opinions prepared at their behest and
used by them to sell penny stocks); In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d
828, 862 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (holding that the defendant was a "maker" because it took
another company's private placement memoranda and "put them into investors"' hands).
9. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299, 2302.
10. 751 F.3d 272, 273-80 (4th Cir. 2014).
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nal cases. Janus was a private right of action and, according to Prousalis,
the concerns that led the Supreme Court to limit liability in such cases do
not apply to criminal actions.
Prousalis is, quite simply, wrong. The majority's analysis in Janus was
first and foremost based on the text of Rule 10b-5, particularly the use of
the word "make." The relevant text is the same whether the government
or a private party brings the action. Prousalis misunderstands the basic
distinction the Supreme Court has made between private rights of action
and government actions. The government is not subject to all of the re-
quirements imposed on private plaintiffs, but the substance of the con-
duct prohibited by Rule 10b-5, including whether the defendant has
"made" a false statement, does not depend on who brings the action.
The Prousalis majority offers two other arguments to bolster its hold-
ing. First, Prousalis argues that extending Janus to criminal cases would
be contrary to notions of judicial restraint and legislative primacy. Sec-
ond, Prousalis points out that no other court has applied Janus in a crimi-
nal context. Those arguments are specious at best, disingenuous at worst.
They provide absolutely no support for the court's conclusion.
"Make" means "make." The word does not magically morph depend-
ing on who asserts the claim. A defendant is directly liable under Rule
10b-5(b) only if, in accordance with Janus, the defendant has ultimate
authority over the fraudulent statement. That is true whether the case is a
private right of action, an SEC enforcement action, or a criminal action.
If the defendant is not a maker within the meaning of Janus, the defen-
dant's liability must lie somewhere outside of Rule 10b-5(b).
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE TWO CASES
A. JANUS AND THE "MAKER" REQUIREMENT
Janus is one of a series of Supreme Court cases, going back at least to
the Blue Chip Stamps case in 1975,11 that have limited the scope of Rule
10b-5. 12 Janus involved a private action under Rule 10b-5(b), which
makes it unlawful, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,
"to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. "13 The
11. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 723-71 (1975) (only pur-
chasers or sellers of securities have standing to sue in private actions under Rule 10b-5).
12. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 185-218 (1976) (a defendant must
have acted with scienter to be liable under Rule 10b-5); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 164-201 (1994) (aiders and abettors
are not liable under Rule 10b-5); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
552 U.S. 148, 148-80 (2008) (defendants who made false statements to facilitate another
company's securities fraud are not liable under Rule lob-5 where the plaintiffs did not
directly rely on those fraudulent statements); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S.
247, 247-86 (2010) (Rule 10b-5 applies only to transactions in securities listed on U.S.
exchanges or domestic transactions in other securities).
13. Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
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plaintiff sought to hold Janus Capital Management, an investment ad-
viser, liable for alleged misstatements in prospectuses filed by the Janus
Investment Fund, a mutual fund it created and advised. The plaintiff al-
leged that Janus Capital Management was "significantly involved in pre-
paring the prospectuses"'14 and disseminated the prospectuses through its
parent company's web site. 15
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the "maker" of a state-
ment for purposes of Rule 10b-5 is "the person or entity with ultimate
authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how
to communicate it.'16 The majority opinion rejected the Court of Ap-
peals' conclusion that Janus Capital could be liable under Rule 10b-5 be-
cause it participated in the drafting and dissemination of the prospectus.' 7
According to the majority, "[o]ne who prepares or publishes a statement
on behalf of another is not its maker."1 8
B. PROUSALIS V. MOORE
Prousalis v. Moore involved a criminal conviction for a violation of
Rule lOb-5. 9 Prousalis was a securities lawyer who prepared registration
materials for an initial public offering by Busybox.com, Inc. Prousalis
concealed the fraud from Busybox's officers and even rejected an attempt
by Busybox's CEO to correct the registration statement.20 Prousalis pled
guilty,2 1 but, after the Janus decision, filed a habeas petition claiming
that, as a result of Janus, his conduct was no longer criminal.22
Prousalis was clearly not the maker of the false statements within the
meaning of Janus.23 The registration statement was Busybox's, and
Busybox had the "ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it."24 Janus makes it clear
that those, like the lawyer in Prousalis, who merely draft fraudulent state-
ments are not makers. However, the majority opinion in Prousalis, writ-
ten by Judge Wilkinson, held that the Janus definition of maker did not
apply in criminal cases, and, therefore, Prousalis's actions could still vio-
late Rule lOb-5. 25
14. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305.
15. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 2299, 2302. The majority noted that, "in the ordinary case, attribution within
a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement
was made by-and only by-the party to whom it was attributed." Id. at 2302.
17. Id. at 2301.
18. Id. at 2302.
19. Prousalis, 751 F.3d at 275.
20. Id. at 274-75.
21. Id. at 273.
22. Id. at 275.
23. See id. at 279 (quoting Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302).
24. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
25. Judge Traxler concurred in the result. He conceded that "'make' has the same
meaning in the criminal context as it does in the context of a private right of action."
Prousalis, 751 F.3d at 279 (Traxler, J., concurring in the result). But he believed Prousalis
would still be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), which imposes liability as a principal on any-
[Vol. 68
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The Prousalis majority presented three arguments in favor of its posi-
tion. First, they pointed out that Janus was a private right of action and
argued that the concerns that led Janus to limit the private right of action
do not apply in the criminal context. 26 Second, they argued that consider-
ations of judicial restraint and legislative primacy counseled against ap-
plying Janus to criminal actions.27 Finally, they pointed out that no other
court had applied Janus in a criminal case.28 I discuss each of those argu-
ments in Section III.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH PROUSALIS
A. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF AcTiON VS. TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION
The Prousalis majority relied primarily on the fact that Janus was a
private right of action; the Supreme Court carefully limited the question
presented to liability in private rights of action. 29 Because the implied
private right of action under Rule lob-5 was judicially created, the Su-
preme Court has construed it narrowly.30 That concern does not apply to
an express criminal action created by Congress.31 Prousalis also notes
that the two main precedents the Janus majority relies on-Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 32 and Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. 33-not only in-
volved private rights of action, but also requirements that would not ap-
ply in criminal cases.34 All of that is correct, but none of it justifies the
conclusion that Prousalis draws-that the Janus definition of "maker"
should not apply in criminal cases.
The Prousalis argument, if correct, would extend beyond criminal ac-
tions. If Janus is limited to private rights of action, then Janus also would
not apply to civil enforcement actions by the SEC.35 The SEC has an
one who "willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another
would be an offense." Id. at 279-80 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2012)).
26. Prousalis, 751 F.3d at 276-78.
27. Id. at 278-79.
28. Id. at 279.
29. Id. at 276; see Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301-02. Donald Langevoort briefly focuses on
this aspect of Janus and asks whether the Supreme Court was construing the rule or just
the private right of action. He calls this "the biggest mystery about the Court's opinion."
Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Ju-
risprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 933, 938 (2013).
30. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
31. Prousalis, 751 F.3d at 277.
32. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
33. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
34. Prousalis, 751 F.3d at 276-77.
35. One court has stated without analysis that Janus does not apply in an SEC enforce-
ment action. See SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377, 422 (S.D.N.Y.
2012). The overwhelming authority is to the contrary. See infra notes 70-72 and accompa-
nying text. And the statement in Pentagon Capital Management is dictum because the case
involved a scheme liability claim under subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, and the court
held that Janus did not apply at all to those subsections. Pentagon Capital Mgmt., 844 F.
Supp. 2d at 422; see also Andrew P. Arnold, Two Faces of Janus in the District Courts: Is
Liability for Securities Fraud under Section 17(a) Limited to Actors with Ultimate Authority
over Untrue Statements, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1054, 1063 (2013) ("[A]lthough the decision in
2015]
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express right of action to enforce Rule 10b-5 and the Supreme Court's
reluctance to expand private rights of action would not extend to SEC
actions. Thus, the question is really whether "maker" has a different
meaning in government actions under Rule 10b-5, civil or criminal, than it
has in private rights of action.
The starting point in answering that question is a distinction the Su-
preme Court itself has made in interpreting Rule 10b-5. According to the
Court, its decisions interpreting Rule 10b-5 have involved two distinct
types of issues: (1) those relating to the scope of conduct prohibited by
Rule 10b-5; and (2) those relating to the elements of a cause of action to
recover against a defendant who has engaged in prohibited conduct. 36
Both Janus and Prousalis fall into the former category-asking what con-
duct is prohibited by Rule 10b-5.
If an issue falls into the latter category-relating to the elements of a
cause of action-the Supreme Court has indicated that private rights of
action raise special concerns, 37 and government actions should be treated
differently. In fact, not treating government actions differently would
often produce silly results. For example, the Supreme Court held in Blue
Chip Stamps that a private party may bring an action under Rule 10b-5
only if she purchased or sold a security in connection with the fraud.38
Since the government will almost never be a purchaser or seller, applying
Blue Chip Stamps to the government would eliminate almost all criminal
and SEC enforcement actions. Similarly, the government is not required
to show reliance in actions under Rule 10b-5, even though that require-
ment is usually imposed on private plaintiffs.39
The special treatment of government cases with respect to this category
of issues comes from outside of Rule 10b-5. Congress has expressly
granted standing to the government to bring criminal and civil enforce-
ment actions alleging fraud directed against others. That externally con-
Janus was premised in part on the need to limit the private right of action, it is apparent
from the plain language of the opinion that the ultimate authority requirement also applies
to claims brought by the SEC."). But see Langevoort, supra note 29, at 941 ("I prefer to
take the Court's statement of its holding literally: we are being told what 'make' means in
the context of private securities litigation under Rule 10b-5, leaving open how it is to be
construed in the context of public enforcement."); Matthew P. Wynne, Rule lOb-5 Enforce-
ment Actions in Light of Janus: Making the Case for Agency Deference, 81 FORDHAM L.
Rnv. 2111, 2114-15 (2013) (arguing that Janus should not apply to SEC enforcement
actions).
36. "In our cases addressing § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we have confronted two main
issues. First, we have determined the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b).... Second, in
cases where the defendant has committed a violation of § 10(b), we have decided questions
about the elements of the 10b-5 private liability scheme: for example, whether there is a
right to contribution, what the statute of limitations is, whether there is a reliance require-
ment, and whether there is an in pari delicto defense." Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 172 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
37. Id. at 173. One of the two important precedents cited in Janus-Stoneridge Invest-
ment Partners-admittedly falls within this category of issues. Stoneridge turned on the
reliance requirement.
38. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 723 (1975).




ferred standing does not depend on the government being a purchaser or
relying on the fraud. But the government must still comply with the ex-
press requirements in Rule lOb-5 itself. It must, for example, show that
the fraud was "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"'40
as required by the language of Rule 10b-5, even though it need not itself
be a purchaser or seller. The government could not bring an action under
Rule 10b-5 for fraud in connection with an appliance sale or a real estate
transaction that did not involve a security.
Neither Janus nor Prousalis fall into this category of cases where gov-
ernment actions get special treatment. They both fall into the other cate-
gory because they concern the scope of conduct prohibited by Rule 10b-
5. In those cases, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the text of the
statute and rule govern. 41 Since the text is the same whether the govern-
ment or a private party brings the action, the scope of prohibited conduct
should not vary.
Decisions involving issues in this category have consistently been ap-
plied to government actions, even if the requirement was announced by
the Supreme Court in a case involving a private right of action. The only
exception is if the law outside of Rule 10b-5 expands liability in govern-
ment actions.
Consider, for example, the scienter requirement. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,42 the Supreme Court case holding that scienter is required
for a defendant to be liable under Rule 10b-5, was a private right of ac-
tion, and, as in Janus, the Court carefully limited the question presented
to private rights of action.43 Yet, the Court strongly rejected the SEC's
subsequent argument that it was not required to prove scienter in an in-
junctive action under Rule 10b-5.44 The Court held that "the rationale of
Hochfelder ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element
of a violation of [section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity
of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought. '45 The Court pointed
out that its holding in Hochfelder was grounded on the language of sec-
tion 10(b) and its legislative history, and those were the same no matter
who the plaintiff was or what remedy was sought.46
Central Bank,47 one of the two precedents Janus relies on, also falls
into this scope-of-prohibited-conduct category. Central Bank held that
40. Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
41. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173.
42. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
43. "The issue in this case is whether an action for civil damages may lie under [§]
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... and... Rule 10b-5 ... in the absence of
an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the part of the defendant."
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 187-88 (emphasis added).
44. Unlike Janus, which said nothing about criminal cases, Hochfelder expressly re-
served that issue. Id. at 193 n.12.
45. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
46. Id. at 694.




aiders and abettors are not liable under Rule 10b-5 because they have not
themselves committed an act prohibited by section 10(b). 48 Central Bank
was a private right of action and the Court carefully limited its discussion
to private rights of action.49 Prousalis argues that Janus's invocation of
Central Bank indicates that Janus's holding "is born out of concerns spe-
cific to the implied civil right since ... aiding and abetting is plainly avail-
able under the criminal law." 50
But aiders and abettors are liable in criminal 10b-5 actions only be-
cause, as Prousalis acknowledges, a separate statute says so,51 not be-
cause Rule 10b-5 is interpreted differently in criminal cases. If there were
a separate statute that broadened the definition of "maker" in criminal
cases under Rule 10b-5, the analogy to Central Bank would be apposite,
but that's not the case.
When a separate statute does not provide for a different rule, Central
Bank actually supports treating government actions the same as private
actions in interpreting scope-of-conduct questions. The dissent in Central
Bank pointed out that the majority's analysis, with its focus on the text of
the statute, "leaves little doubt that the Exchange Act does not even per-
mit the SEC to pursue aiders and abettors in civil enforcement actions. '52
After Central Bank, people on both sides of the policy issue indicated
that Central Bank foreclosed aiding and abetting claims in SEC enforce-
ment actions, not just private actions.53 At least one court dismissed an
SEC aiding-and-abetting claim on the basis of Central Bank54 and others
48. Id.
49. The Court indicated that the question was "whether private civil liability under
§ 10(b) extends as well to those who do not engage in the manipulative or deceptive prac-
tice, but who aid and abet the violation." Id. at 167. At the conclusion of its opinion, the
Court wrote, "we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under § 10(b)." Id. at 191.
50. Prousalis, 751 F.3d at 277.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
52. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. See Abandonment of the Private Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting Securities
Fraud/Staff Report on Private Securities Litigation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (S. Hrg. 103-759,
May 12, 1994), at 71 (statement of Harvey Goldschmid) ("I see no principled basis for"
allowing the SEC to bring aiding and abetting claims.); id. at 128 (letter from Harvey Pitt
to Sen. Dodd) ("I do not believe it is open to question that the Central Bank decision will
preclude the SEC from imposing Rule 10b-5 aiding and abetting liability."); id. at 152 (let-
ter from Joel Seligman to Sen. Riegle) ("[T]here appears to be no principled basis to avoid
Federal courts also holding that the SEC may not bring §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims for
aiding and abetting."). But see id. at 54 (statement of Donald Langevoort) ("If we take the
Court literally, then the SEC has lost its ability to charge aiders and abettors with viola-
tions of Rule 10b-5," but this result "is not inevitable."); 5 ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D.
LOWENFELS & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD
§ 7:305 (2d ed. 2014) (The logic of the majority opinion in Central Bank "seemed to apply
to SEC civil enforcement," but "it [is] possible that one or two of the majoritarians might
have reasoned differently in an SEC suit.").
54. SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 155 F.3d 107
(2d Cir. 1998). The Second Circuit vacated the judgment because it found that the defen-
dant was a primary violator. SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 68
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expressed doubts about such claims in dictum.55 The SEC essentially sur-
rendered, voluntarily dismissing its aiding and abetting claims under Rule
10b-5, 56 but Congress quickly rode to the rescue, adding a provision to
the Exchange Act that allows the SEC to pursue aiders and abettors.57
Far from supporting the Prousalis argument, this history shows that Su-
preme Court holdings as to the scope of defendants' liability in private
rights of action also apply to government actions unless there is express
statutory authority to the contrary.
The heart of the majority's analysis in Janus is textual, interpreting the
word "make," with citations to two dictionaries to bolster that interpreta-
tion.58 Only after the majority concludes that the word "make" requires
ultimate authority over the statement does it discuss Central Bank and
Stoneridge and note that "[o]ur holding also accords with the narrow
scope that we must give the implied private right of action." 59 And Justice
Breyer's dissent in Janus, pointing out the consequences of the new rule,
simply assumes that the holding would apply to SEC enforcement
actions.60
The Prousalis argument that the single word "make" in Rule lob-5 has
two different meanings depending on who brings the action is inconsis-
tent with this textual analysis. The Supreme Court has said that identical
words in different parts of the same securities statute are to be inter-
preted the same. 61 Prousalis doesn't even involve different parts of the
same statute or regulation; it is reading one word in one place to have two
different meanings. This contradicts not only Janus but the entire line of
Supreme Court scope-of-conduct cases.
55. See SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to "Central Bank's
apparent elimination of the SEC's power to enjoin the aiding and abetting of securities law
violations"); SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 694 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating in an SEC
enforcement action, "[t]he evidence also supports a finding that Bilzerian aided and abet-
ted Jefferies' margin and record keeping violations, although there is now reason to doubt
that he could be held civilly liable for such aiding and abetting").
56. See, e.g., SEC v. Patel, 1994 WL 364089, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1994), aft'din
part and rev'd in part, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995); SEC v. Militano, 1994 WL 285472, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1994); see also Abandonment of the Private Right of Action, supra note
53, at 48 (statement of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt) ("Because alternative enforcement
options exist, the Commission does not believe that it would be prudent to devote substan-
tial resources to litigate the issue of whether the Central Bank of Denver decision applies
to Commission enforcement actions.").
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012); see also Lewis
D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, A New Standard for Aiders and Abettors under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 52 Bus. LAw. 1 (1996) (discussing the
statutory change to allow SEC actions against aiders and abettors).
58. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
"Although it may be clear that Janus was motivated by a concern for private actions, the
simplicity of distinguishing the Janus decision on the basis of the plaintiff's identity belies
an obvious impediment: the Court based its entire decision on the word 'make."' John
Patrick Clayton, The Two Faces of Janus: The Jurisprudential Past and New Beginning of
Rule 10b-5, 47 U. MIcH. J. L. REFORM 853, 872 (2014).
59. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86
(2006); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995).
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B. OTHER ARGUMENTS
The private action/government action distinction was not the Prousalis
majority's only argument for rejecting Janus. Prousalis made two other
arguments, but neither of those arguments provides serious support for
the result. The other two arguments are specious, or to a less charitable
reader, even disingenuous.
1. Considerations of Judicial Restraint and Legislative Primacy
The Prousalis majority argued that "considerations of judicial restraint
and legislative primacy" also supported its holding.62 According to the
majority, "[e]xplicit congressional prohibitions simply operate in a differ-
ent universe than the one inhabited by Janus. ' 63 A criminal action under
Rule 10b-5 "[lies] squarely within the legislature's traditional prerogative
to prescribe crimes and ranges of punishment. '64 Congress, not the
courts, has the power to control federal jurisdiction and "the elements of
federal criminal offenses. '65
The weakness of this argument is apparent once one considers exactly
what Congress has and has not done with respect to criminal liability
under Rule 10b-5. Nothing in any statute enacted by Congress expressly
contradicts the Supreme Court's interpretation in Janus. Nor, as far as I
know, does anything in the legislative history.66
Congress's sole statement on criminal liability under Rule 10b-5 is in
section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, which imposes criminal penalties on
''any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter ... or any
rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or
the observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter. '67
Except for the willfulness requirement, section 32(a) says nothing about
who's liable and under what circumstances. Section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act, the only other congressional prohibition the Prousalis major-
ity might be deferring to, does not by itself make any conduct unlawful.
Section 10(b) merely makes it unlawful "to use or employ.., any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.' 68 In short, there is no
"explicit congressional prohibition" to defer to; the language of the prohi-
bition, whether in a civil or a criminal case, lies squarely within an SEC
rule. Congress has said nothing about the extent of criminal liability
under Rule 10b-5, so applying Janus in criminal cases would in no way
disturb any legislative prerogatives.




66. Neither Janus nor Prousalis cite any legislative history to the contrary.
67. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
68. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added).
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2. No Other Cases Apply Janus in the Criminal Context
The weakness of the Prousalis opinion is best illustrated by its conclud-
ing point. The majority noted that not a single appellate or district court
had applied Janus in the criminal context, concluding, "[t]here is a good
reason for this dearth of cases. It is not the role of courts to blaze new
trails into uncharted territory in the absence of any clear textual or prece-
dential mandate for doing so."'69
What the Prousalis majority neglected to mention was that, except for
Prousalis, not a single appellate or district court case had refused to apply
Janus in the criminal context. There were no criminal cases applying Ja-
nus because Prousalis was the first published case raising the issue.
There are, however, several cases discussing the application of Janus in
SEC enforcement proceedings. The Prousalis majority ignored these
cases, which do not support its position. A number of lower courts have
applied Janus to SEC enforcement actions under Rule lOb-5, 70 and
others have assumed arguendo that Janus applies to such actions. 71 In
fact, the SEC has conceded in several enforcement cases under Rule 10b-
5(b) that Janus applies to it.72 Only one court has said that Janus does not
apply to SEC enforcement cases and that case didn't involve subsection
(b) of Rule 10b-5, so its statement is dictum at best.73
Since the distinction made in Prousalis between private actions and
public enforcement applies with equal force to SEC enforcement actions,
the majority's failure to note these cases is bewildering. If Rule 10b-5
applied to judicial decisions, this omission would probably violate the
rule.7 4 But, to be charitable to the opinion's author, perhaps "make"
means something different when applied to judicial opinions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority in Janus meant exactly what it said: the person who
"makes" a fraudulent statement for purposes of Rule 10b-5 is "the person
or entity with ultimate authority over the statement. '75 That holding, like
other Supreme Court decisions restricting the scope of Rule 10b-5, may
69. Prousalis, 751 F.3d at 279.
70. See SEC v. Levin, 2013 WL 5588224, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2013); SEC v.
Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2012); SEC v. Perry, 2012 WL 1959566, at *8
(C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012); SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Group, Inc., 2012 WL 1079961, at *5
(N.D. I11. Mar. 30, 2012); SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC
v. Carter, 2011 WL 5980966, at *2-3 (N.D. I11. Nov. 28, 2011).
71. See SEC v. Garber, 959 F. Supp. 2d 372, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); SEC v. Landberg,
836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
72. See SEC v. Benger, 931 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912 (N.D. I1. 2013), and cases cited
therein.
73. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
74. Under Rule lOb-5, a statement is actionable if it "omit[s] to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading." Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(b).
75. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299, 2302.
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or may not be good policy. But, unless Congress revises the statute, the
SEC revises the rule, or the Supreme Court reverses itself, Janus is the
law. Unless a person "makes" a statement within the meaning of Janus,
that person's conduct does not violate Rule 10b-5(b), no matter who is
asserting the violation.
Prousalis's argument to the contrary is wrong. The word "make" in
Rule 10b-5 does not magically transform into something entirely different
if the person bringing the claim happens to be affiliated with the United
States government. "Make" means "make," no matter who's asking.
